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 1 
The Case for Original Intent 
Jamal Greene
†
 
Introduction 
Originalism has been running away from its past.  H. Jefferson Powell 
wrote in 1985 that constitutional actors from as early as the nullification debates 
of the 1830s “expressed their views as explications of the ‘original intent’ of the 
framers,”1 and that “[b]y the outbreak of the Civil War, intentionalism in the 
modern sense reigned supreme in the rhetoric of constitutional interpretation.”2  
Powell took intentionalism as his subject because it was, at the time, being offered 
by “interpretivists” 3  like Raoul Bergerand Edwin Meese as a salve to liberal 
judicial activism.  Berger, whom Cass Sunstein called “the engineer of 
originalism as a serious approach to constitutional interpretation,”4  offered, in 
Government by Judiciary, an extended defense of “[e]ffectuation of the 
draftsman’s intention” in constitutional law. 5   Meese famously directed the 
Reagan Justice Department to pursue a “jurisprudence of original intention.”.6 
And yet there was U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Antonin Scalia, just one 
year after Powell’s canonical article and three days away from being announced 
as a Supreme Court nominee,
7
 saying that he “ought to campaign to change the 
label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.”8  
The appropriate inquiry, Scalia said, is into “the most plausible meaning of the 
                                                        
†
Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Thanks to Kurt Lash, John McGinnis, 
participants at the Brooklyn Law School Legal Theory Colloquium, and participants at the George 
Washington Law Review symposium on the 100th anniversary of Farrand’s  Records of the 
Federal Convention for helpful conversation. Morenike Fajana provided excellent research 
assistance. 
1
 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 945-
46 (1985). 
2
 Id. at 947. 
3
 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705–07 
(1975). 
4
 Cass Sunstein, Debate on Radicals in Robes, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 
287, 293 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
5
 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 365 (1977). 
6
 Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464-65 (1986).  
7
 See Bernard Weinraub, Burger Retiring, Rehnquist Named Chief; Scalia, Appeals Court Judge, 
Chosen for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 18, 1986, at A1. 
8
 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties in 
Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Original 
Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook (1987). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066234
 2 
words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it – regardless of what the 
Framers might secretly have intended.”9  Today, most academic originalists and 
even some living constitutionalists
10
 say that constitutional interpretation should 
proceed, first and foremost, from the original meaning of the text at issue.  Even 
as originalism has assumed a privileged place within constitutional theory 
discourse, intentionalism is in a bad way.
 11
 
Here’s the puzzle then.  This article is part of a symposium celebrating the 
centennial of Max Farrand’s Records of the Constitutional Convention.  Farrand’s 
Records is the most comprehensive collection of primary documents chronicling 
the deliberations in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.
 
  The Records is, 
along with The Federalist, one of the two principal sources of the intentions of the 
Constitution’s drafters. Given the limited relevance of those intentions to the 
theories advanced by both originalists and living constitutionalists, it is a wonder 
why constitutional theorists should so fête the anniversary of Farrand’s Records.  
It is a particular wonder why we should do so through an event whose keynote 
speaker was Justice Scalia, the person most responsible for marginalizing the 
relevance of the Records to modern constitutional theory. 
This article offers a solution to the puzzle.  It argues, in brief, that we 
celebrate the centennial of Farrand’s Records for the same reason judges 
consistently cite the Records and The Federalist in opinions: original intent not 
only matters but it matters more than original meaning.  And well it should. As 
many original meaning originalists have themselves emphasized, the practice of 
resolving constitutional cases is distinct from the practice of ascertaining the 
meaning of the words of the Constitution.
12
  The question of what a text signifies 
goes to the text’s meaning; the question of the degree to which it should govern 
cases and controversies goes to the text’s authority.13  Many originalists implicitly 
acknowledge that constitutional authority, not constitutional meaning as such, 
                                                        
9
 Id. at 103. 
10
 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-4, 21 (2011). 
11
 But see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 163 (1999); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is 
that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 967, 969 (1996); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009). 
12
 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
89–121 (2004); LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 3–4 (2011); WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 11, at 5. 
13
 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 606, 633 (2008). 
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matters to modern adjudication.
14
  An adjudicator who decides that the meaning 
of a constitutional provision is supplied by the original meaning of the words is 
not thereby committed to the view that she should decide cases solely on the basis 
of that meaning.  Likewise, and less recognized, someone who believes that the 
subjective intentions of the eighteenth-century framers should be authoritative in 
modern interpretation need not adopt any particular theory (nor even believe) that 
those intentions supply either the linguistic or the legal “meaning” of 
constitutional provisions.  Original intent is disfavored as a theory of 
constitutional meaning but it remains a vital theory of constitutional authority. 
Part I briefly explains the impetus behind the theoretical shift from 
original intent to original meaning, which was driven in large measure by 
hermeneutic criticism from scholars like Powell and Paul Brest.  Brest 
emphasized the impossibility of discerning the “intent” of a multimember body 
with an array of contradictory and indeterminate subjective ends,
15
 and Powell 
concluded based on historical research that the Framers would not have 
subjectively intended a constitutional methodology of original subjective intent.
16
  
Original meaning, celebrated for its objectivity and its consistency with traditional 
approaches to legal interpretation,
17
 was advanced as a more practicable and 
theoretically satisfying alternative.
18
 
As Part II explains, however, constitutional practice continues to privilege 
intentionalism. Citation to the Records, to The Federalist (especially to James 
Madison’s writings), and to independent writings or speeches of Madison, 
Washington, and Jefferson
19
 indicate that constitutional practitioners continue to 
reason as though the intentions and expectations of prominent members of the 
founding generation are highly relevant to the Constitution’s application to 
modern cases and controversies.  Public discourse, moreover, is by all 
appearances indifferent to the scholarly distinction between original meaning and 
original intent.  As Justice Scalia writes, “the Great Divide with regard to 
constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and objective 
                                                        
14
 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 13 (“Examination of the goals and limitations of 
interpretation emphasizes the fact that other modes of constitutional elaboration are both possible 
and necessary.”). 
15
 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 
213–17 (1980). 
16
 See Powell, supra note 1, at 887–88. 
17
 See Scalia, supra note 8, at 104. 
18
 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248–49 (2009). 
19
 Jefferson was not, of course, a constitutional drafter, but as Parts II-III explain, his intentions 
and expectations nonetheless carry significant authority in constitutional argument precisely 
because intent need not be in the service of linguistic meaning. 
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meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether derived from 
Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”20 
Scalia and many other originalists explain the privileging of original intent 
over original meaning, or what is at best a frequent conflation of the two, as a 
kind of shorthand: “When the proponents of original intent invoke the Founding 
Fathers, I in fact understand them to invoke them,” Scalia has said, as “strong 
indications of what the most knowledgeable people of the time understood the 
words to mean.” 21    But the better way to understand the persistent, indeed 
essential, professional practice of appearing to care deeply about the intentions of 
the drafters is by reference to a theory that regards those intentions as wielding 
normative authority in constitutional argument. We may (and once did) describe 
an originalist as someone who believes that the product of constitutional 
construction should, as a normative matter, reflect the values, expectations, or 
intentions of the individuals responsible for declaring American independence, 
defeating the British in the American Revolution, and drafting and ratifying the 
Constitution.  Part III argues that the time has come to bring intentionalists back 
into the constitutional mainstream.  
 
I. The Rise of Original Meaning 
 The story of the shift from original intent to original meaning is well-
trodden ground.
22
  There is no need to linger on its particulars in this space except 
to recap the reasons why so many originalists claim to reject intentionalism.  The 
canonical critiques of original intent were offered by Paul Brest and by Powell.
23
  
Brest identified significant problems with allowing original intent, either of the 
framers of the Constitution or of the ratifiers in the state conventions, to govern 
constitutional interpretation.
24
  Chief among those problems is the paradox of 
numerosity.
25
  The individual intentions of drafters or adopters must be shared by 
a sufficient number of delegates to count as law, but unless those intentions are 
understood at a level of generality too high to give practical guidance, it will often 
be the case that individual framers—and a fortiori individual adopters—had either 
an indeterminate intent or none at all with respect to particular questions.
26
 
                                                        
20
 See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
21
 Scalia, supra note 8, at 103. 
22
 The standard account appears in Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. 
L. REV. 611, 611–12, 620 (1999). 
23
 Id. at 612. 
24
 See Brest, supra note 15, at 213-17.   
25
 See id. 
26
 See id. For an opposing view, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 187–95. 
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Powell argued, contrary to Berger but consistent with Brest,
 27
 Scalia,
28
 
and many others, that the framers were not themselves intentionalists in the 
subjective sense.
29
  “As understood by its late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century proponents,” Powell writes, “the original intent relevant to constitutional 
discourse was not that of the Philadelphia framers, but rather that of the parties to 
the constitutional compact — the states as political entities.”30  Discerning intent 
in this sense might, on occasion, have involved reference to state ratification 
debates, but it did not entail plumbing the statements of drafters at the 
Philadelphia Convention.  Accepting Powell’s criticism meant that intentionalism 
was at war with itself, since the Framers would not have subjectively intended 
that modern interpretation be guided by their subjective intentions. 
 Original-meaning originalism is said to avoid or mitigate these criticisms 
along several dimensions. First, the original meaning originalist need not 
aggregate subjective, incommensurable intentions; he is instead seeking the most 
defensible objective meaning of words.  This practice, by hypothesis, always has 
an answer, even if arriving at that answer requires the exercise of judgment.
31
   
Second, one may be an original meaning originalist without committing to the 
view that the framers would have approved of that interpretive method.
32
  Third, 
in any event, Powell and others have shown that original meaning originalism is 
broadly consistent with hermeneutic practices with which the framers were 
familiar and of which they approved.
33
 
 In order to understand the broader story of the move from original intent 
to original meaning, it is crucial to recognize the distinct senses in which original 
intent and original meaning theories are concerned with judicial restraint.  Judges 
engaged in constitutional review seek rules of decision that can guide their 
discretion and help them identify the content of the law they must apply.  Insofar 
as methods of constitutional interpretation help judges to arrive at those rules, it is 
in their nature to promote judicial restraint of this kind.  According to its 
proponents, original meaning originalism achieves this type of restraint better 
                                                        
27
 See Brest, supra note 15, at 215-16. 
28
 See Scalia, supra note 8, at 104. 
29
 Powell, supra note 1, at 886-88. 
30
 Id. at 887-88. For an opposing view, see Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The 
Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007). 
31
 See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 
535 (1998) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)). 
32
 See Barnett, supra note 22, at 648.  But see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) (arguing that “the Constitution should be 
interpreted using the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed 
applicable to it”).  
33
 See Powell, supra note 1, at 948; Barnett, supra note 22, at 625–29. 
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than common law, evolutionary, or morality-based approaches to adjudication 
through its transparency and objectivity.
34
  These features also recommend 
original meaning originalism over original intent, whose capacity for settling 
constitutional meaning depends on a methodological coherence that, if we accept 
Brest’s criticism, it cannot claim.35 
 But there is a second overlapping but not always compatible kind of 
judicial restraint.  Some political proponents of originalism in the 1970s and 
1980s supported it as an alternative to living constitutionalism not because it 
provided transparent criteria and therefore better served the settlement function of 
constitutional methodology but rather because it promised to arrest social and 
moral changes that those proponents found threatening.
36
  Originalism was an 
appropriate response to the Warren Court because it was tied to conservative 
political projects and cultural assumptions.
37
  On this view the activist judge is not 
the one lacking objective decisional criteria but the one who too easily facilitates 
alteration of the status quo.
38
  It is on this view of judicial restraint that original 
intent originalism soars.  It beckons constitutional interpretation back to a time 
associated with values that better resonate with the world view of originalism’s 
proponents.
39
 
 Originalism’s academic refinement from original meaning to original 
intent has been in the service of the first kind of judicial restraint and to the 
detriment of the second kind.  But a felt need for the second kind of restraint is 
alive and well in our politics and, as Part II shows, in our law. 
 
II. The Practical Relevance of Original Intent 
                                                        
34
 See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberrty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2414-15 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–64 (1989). 
35
 See Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 
77 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 251 (1989) (“[T]he founders' intent does not have the consistency of 
homogenized milk. It is more like a well-stocked pantry waiting for the imaginative chef.”). 
36
 See Meese, supra note 6, at 464 (advocating originalism as a defense against “a drift back 
toward the radical egalitarianism and expansive civil libertarianism of the Warren Court”). 
37
 See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183, 1187–88. 
38
 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 862. 
39
 See generally Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) (examining the demographics and views of individuals who 
consider themselves originalists).  
 7 
The need to defend the utility of the Convention debates to modern 
originalism is familiar to modern originalists.
40
  In particular, the fact that the 
records of the debates were sealed, and therefore unavailable to the ratifiers and to 
ordinary Americans, means that relying on those records as an authoritative guide 
either to the ratifiers’ understanding or to original public meaning requires 
explanation.
41
  It is useful to consider an example from an influential 2003 article 
by Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen.
42
 Kesavan and Paulsen advance 
the following proposition: 
 
A hypothetical, recently-discovered, heretofore-secret, intelligently-
written, private letter from private citizen Reverend John Clergyman to 
private citizen Mr. John Farmer Parishioner, dated January 1, 1788, and 
making the point, based on its author’s learned evaluation of then-current 
historical political assumptions, that the Constitution’s assignment of “the 
executive Power” to the President necessarily embraces the presumptive 
power to formulate and carry out the nation’s foreign affairs policy, would 
display something about the meaning the term “the executive Power” had 
to an informed member of the general public.  The fact that Reverend 
Clergyman was not a Framer or a Ratifier would be, under an original 
meaning-textualist approach, pretty much immaterial.  Clergyman’s letter 
is at least competent evidence of original meaning, notwithstanding its 
purely private nature.
43
 
 
As noted below, Kesavan and Paulsen believe that, because it is private, such a 
letter is inferior  to both the Convention debates and to The Federalist as evidence 
of original meaning.
44
  The important point for now, though, is their implicit 
acknowledgement of our constitutional culture’s deep reliance on sources (such as 
statements by framers and ratifiers) consistent with intentionalism and its shallow 
reliance on other sources (such as the letter) that are consistent with original 
meaning originalism. 
I would go further than Kesavan and Paulsen.  Any U.S. lawyer or judge 
who considers Clergyman’s letter as good a source of constitutional meaning as a 
comparable statement by Madison at the Philadelphia Convention is in fact 
incompetent within the norms of American constitutional practice.  This is not to 
                                                        
40
 See Generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) (examining the role of records 
from the Constitutional Convention in interpreting the Constitution). 
41
 See id. at 1113-21.  
42
 See id. 
43
 Id. at 1146. 
44
 See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text. 
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say that such a lawyer or judge lacks integrity or is not engaged in a coherent, or 
even ingenious, hermeneutic practice within some domain; it is simply to say that 
that domain is not American constitutional law.  The Federalist and Farrand’s 
Records are the two most significant sources of original understanding
45
 in our 
constitutional tradition.
46
  The Supreme Court has cited the Constitutional 
Convention in at least 164 cases,
47
 and it has referenced The Federalist in 236 
opinions from 1965 to 2005 alone.
48
  Significantly, citation to the Federalist has 
increased dramatically during the period in which original-meaning originalism 
has been ascendant.  According to research by Ira Lupu, The Federalist was cited 
more often in the 19 years from 1980 to 1998 than in the 80 previous years 
combined.
49
  From 1986 to 2002, according to Melvyn Durchslag, the Supreme 
Court referenced The Federalist in 42 percent more cases (98 cases) than during 
the preceding 16 years,
50
 with Justice Scalia writing nearly one-fifth of those 
opinions.
51
 Citation to the Convention debates has generally decreased as original 
meaning originalism has gained prominence,
52
 but the Court’s originalists do not 
appear to be responsible for that decrease.  Justice Scalia cited to the Convention 
debates in eight Supreme Court opinions from 1986 to 2009, and Justice Thomas 
did so in seven opinions from 1991 to 2009.
53
 For each Justice, that number of 
citations is the highest of any member of the Court during that Justice’s tenure.  
 An original meaning originalist confronted with these patterns of citation 
may offer a number of responses.  A familiar reply is to suggest reasons why 
someone holding original meaning commitments should nonetheless consider 
Convention debates and The Federalist relevant to constitutional interpretation. 
This justification typically involves describing the debates or The Federalist as 
evidence of the usage of words and phrases that appear in the Constitution,
54
 what 
David McGowan calls “a topical equivalent of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary or 
                                                        
45
 I use the term “original understanding” here to encompass both original intent and original 
meaning inquiries. 
46
 The Federalist and the Records were the two most frequently cited originalist sources in 
Supreme Court cases from 1955 to 1984.  See Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. 
Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. 
Q. 329, 330 (2005). 
47
 Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Convention, 27 J.L. & POL. 63, 
71 (2011). 
48
 Corley, Howard, & Nixon, supra note 46, at 330. 
49
 See Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 
1328 (1998). 
50
 Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here Than 
Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 295 (2005). 
51
 Id. at 297. 
52
 See Sirico, Jr., supra note 47, at 170–71. 
53
 Id. at 99-100, 168, 175. 
54
 See Scalia, supra note 20, at 38. 
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any other usage guide.” 55   Randy Barnett writes that excavation of original 
meaning proponents is not directed to “how the relevant generation of ratifiers 
expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to specific cases . . 
. except as circumstantial evidence of what the more technical words and phrases 
in the text might have meant to a reasonable listener.”56  Kesavan and Paulsen 
describe the Records as “an excellent, first-rate resource of rich insight into 
original linguistic meaning.”57 
 Whether or not original meaning originalists believe they are using the 
Records and The Federalist for this reason—on which this article is, and must be, 
agnostic—the pattern of citation to these sources is difficult to explain solely by 
reference to this justification.  Use of those two sources in federal judicial 
opinions simply overwhelms other sources of the contemporaraneous meaning of 
the Constitution’s words and phrases, as Kesavan and Paulsen’s private letter 
example implicitly concedes.
58
  Of course, private letters may be difficult to come 
by, much less to authenticate.  A time-constrained judge will be forgiven for 
declining to mine the full corpus of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writings 
on the nascent Constitution when the Convention debates and The Federalist, 
which will do, are sitting on his bookshelf. 
But the secret letters of Reverend Clergyman are hardly the only option.  
What of the anonymous writings of antifederalists like Brutus, Cato, and the 
Federal Farmer, which are no less available than the Federalist? Robert Yates (the 
most likely “Brutus”) was a New York Supreme Court judge and a delegate at the 
Philadelphia Convention.
59
  George Clinton (the most likely “Cato”)60 was the 
longtime governor of New York and later Vice President of the United States.
61
  
Richard Henry Lee (the most likely “Federal Farmer”)62 was a signatory to the 
Declaration of Independence. 
63
 These were educated men and yet their 
understandings of the Constitution’s language are rarely treated as “topical 
                                                        
55
 David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the 
Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 757 (2001); see also Prakash, supra note 31, at 537 
(writing that extensive reference to statements of the “founding fathers” in originalist writing is an 
effort “to make sense of the text by surveying how its words were used in common parlance”). 
56
 Barnett, supra note 22, at 622. 
57
 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1133. 
58
 See Corley, Howard, & Nixon, supra note 46, at 330; supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
59
 See Shlomo Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis on Judicial Supremacy, 23 
Const. Comment. 7, 10 n.7 (2006).  But see THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 103 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 
1981) (sowing doubt about the traditional attribution). 
60
 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1151. 
61
 See JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 255-61, 
274-75 (1993).  
62
 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1151.) 
63
 Lee, Richard Henry, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000201 (last visited April 9, 2012).  
 10 
concordances” on the meaning of the Constitution. 64   Quite the opposite.  
Consider the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) in 
United States v. Comstock,
65
 in which he argued for a limited reading of the scope 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
 
During the State ratification debates, Anti-Federalists expressed concern 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause would give Congress virtually 
unlimited power.  See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, in 2 The Complete Anti-
Federalist 421 (H. Storing ed. 1981). Federalist supporters of the 
Constitution swiftly refuted that charge, explaining that the Clause did not 
grant Congress any freestanding authority, but instead made explicit what 
was already implicit in the grant of each enumerated power.  Referring to 
the “powers declared in the Constitution,” Alexander Hamilton noted that 
“it is expressly to execute these powers that the sweeping clause . . . 
authorizes the national legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws.”  
The Federalist No. 33, at 245.  James Madison echoed this view, stating 
that “the sweeping clause . . . only extend[s] to the enumerated powers.”  3 
J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution 455 (2d ed. 1854).
66
 
 
As evidence of the objective public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
it is not obvious why Brutus’s view—that it gives Congress “virtually unlimited 
power”—is any less reliable than Hamilton’s or Madison’s.67  
Kesavan and Paulsen argue that The Federalist is a better original 
meaning source than the writings of antifederalists because “[t]he Federalists 
won” and “the statements of opponents of legislation are entitled to less weight 
than those of proponents.”68  This is correct, of course, as a description of the 
practice of constitutional and legislative construction,
69
 but it is not because 
opponents are somehow less knowledgeable about the contemporary meaning of 
words or have less access to prevailing public wisdom. 
Nor have we any reason to assume that antifederalist writings are any less 
credible than The Federalist.  The writings of Brutus and Cato are no more nor 
less propagandistic than those of Publius.
 
  As William Eskridge writes, “Because 
they were propaganda documents, seeking (often disingenuously) to rebut the 
arguments of the Anti-Federalists, some historians are reluctant to conclude that 
                                                        
64
 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1147-48.   
65
 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
66
 Id. at 1972 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
67
 See McGowan, supra note 55, at 757. 
68
 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1152. 
69
 See id. 
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The Federalist even honestly reflects the views of Madison and Hamilton 
themselves.”70  Less discussed but still more problematic, it is possible to identify 
numerous instances in which The Federalist is obviously wrong.
71
 Seth Barrett 
Tillman has done so, noting among other examples that Federalist No. 59 
incorrectly states that 16 Senators constitutes a quorum
72
 and that Federalist No. 
68 misstates the process for selecting the Vice President in the event the Electoral 
College is inconclusive.
73
  In a document written in great haste as part of a high-
stakes political agenda, it is unsurprising that we would find errors.
 
 
 Heavy reliance on Farrand’s Records might be even more troubling by this 
measure.  One need not accept William Winslow Crosskey’s insinuation that 
Madison’s notes were “deliberately false and misleading”74 to conclude that notes 
taken in shorthand and later augmented by an aggressive political operative on 
debates whose proceedings were constrained by British parliamentary procedure 
should not be favored evidence of the meaning of words.
75
  As James Hutson, 
who edited the fifth supplementary volume of the Records, has noted, Madison’s 
notes for any particular day can be read aloud in a few minutes, and yet he 
purported to be recording several hours’ worth of proceedings per day.76  These 
limitations are familiar to original meaning originalists and are indeed reason for 
them not to be intentionalists in the subjective sense.  But they also undermine the 
notion that the  The Federalist and the Records provide comparatively “first-
rate”77 evidence of original meaning.78 
A second, less common originalist response to the ineluctable reality that 
“intentionalist” sources appear to be privileged even by many originalists is in the 
nature of a mea culpa, or perhaps a sua culpa.  This response refuses to defend 
such citations and simply outs them as either always or often inappropriate.  
Steven Calabresi has said, for example, that he “attach[es] no weight to secret 
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legislative histories.”79   Original meaning originalist Judge Frank Easterbrook 
writes favorably of John Marshall’s originalism that “[h]is opinions rest squarely 
on constitutional text—not on imputed intent, not on The Federalist, not on the 
debates in the Convention (which had been kept secret), not on the debates of the 
ratifying conventions . . . , and not even on the opinions he had [previously] 
written.”80  These scholars acknowledge the norms of constitutional practice but 
seek to change them to accommodate their particular views on originalism.  Let it 
suffice for now to say that these normative efforts have not yet met with success.  
As Part III discusses, moreover, the aversion of some original meaning 
originalists to original intent arguments may rest on a too-narrow understanding 
of the role such arguments play within our constitutional culture. 
A third, increasingly popular response to the disjunction between original 
meaning originalism and constitutional practice is to acknowledge that the former 
is not always directed to the latter.  That is, original meaning originalism is a 
theory of “interpretation,” an effort to understand what constitutional text 
signifies,
 81
 whereas constitutional adjudication and implementation involves a 
process of constitutional “construction” that is constrained (perhaps lightly) by 
interpretation but is not controlled by it.
82
  On this view, defining constitutional 
language is distinct from crafting constitutional decision rules and supplying 
meaning to the Constitution through political and social contestation and 
inertia.—  The interpretation-construction distinction is what enables Jack Balkin 
to claim no incompatibility between originalism and living constitutionalism: for 
Balkin, the former is an exercise in interpretation whereas the latter is an exercise 
in construction.
83
 
This article proposes a variation on this third theme.  It makes two moves.  
The first move is to identify constitutional construction with a related term of 
longer lineage.  A theory of constitutional construction may be understood as a 
particular kind of theory of constitutional authority.  It is a conceptual apparatus 
that specifies whether and how to assign weight to competing sources of 
constitutional wisdom when—because of vagueness, indeterminacy, or normative 
preference—no single source is dispositive.  The second move is to understand 
that originalism may readily be conceptualized as a theory of authority either in 
addition to or instead of a theory of interpretation.  On this view, originalism is 
                                                        
79
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 SOLUM, supra note 12, at 3–4, 69–71. 
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not only the notion that the meaning of constitutional text is specified by its 
original public meaning; it is also the notion that the subjective expectations of 
the framers are a privileged source of wisdom within constitutional practice.  
When we refer to the Convention debates or to The Federalist, it is often in the 
service of this second understanding of originalism, the one that occurred to most 
legal professionals prior to the celebrated shift to original meaning, and the one 
that still occurs to many legal professionals today. 
On this view, original understandings are authoritative not because they 
specify the semantic meaning of a text but because they reflect a set of values that 
are offered by proponents as uniquely or especially constitutive of American 
identity.  Invoking the intentions of the framers is a rhetorical, not a philosophical 
or linguistic exercise; what makes someone an originalist of this sort are her 
priorities within an argumentative tradition.  Pace Balkin, it is not that originalism 
is interpretive and living constitutionalism is constructive.
84
  Instead, we can 
understand, and long have understood, the principal dichotomy between the two 
as playing out within rather than independent of the domain of construction.
85
  In 
Bobbitt’s terms, we may style the originalism this article identifies as a form of 
ethical argument, one that locates American ethos in a particular stylized past.
86
  
From this perspective, the drafters’ intent is not just one example of reasonable 
views about the meaning of words, but is a better, more persuasive example than 
others because the drafters carry authority in narratives of American identity.  
From this perspective, moreover, the “Framers” include people like 
Thomas Jefferson, who was out of the country during the Constitution’s drafting 
but whose role in the Declaration of Independence, in the Louisiana Purchase, and 
in the formation and articulation of an influential strand of early American 
political identity make his imprimatur extremely valuable in constitutional 
argument. Likewise, the post-ratification practices of President Washington, 
which appear frequently in originalist writing, are not merely relevant but are 
essential sources of authority within the ongoing practice of constitutional 
construction.
87
  
 Evidence of this form of originalism is abundant, and the explanatory 
power of understanding intentionalist originalism in this ethical sense is vast 
indeed.  According to Charles Pierson, Justice Chase made the first Supreme 
                                                        
84
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85
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Court reference to The Federalist in Calder v. Bull,
88
 seeking support for the 
proposition that an ex post facto law must relate to criminal punishment.
89
  Justice 
Chase wrote: 
 
The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, 
considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done.  His 
opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author 
of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and 
accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government.
90
 
 
Pierson surmises that Chase meant to heap praise upon Hamilton, who he 
believed wrote Federalist No. 44, which was actually written by Madison.
91
  The 
point, in any event, is that Chase’s reliance on The Federalist was not to access 
collective knowledge about the meaning of words.  Chase was a criminal court 
judge at the time the Constitution was ratified; his personal opinion as to the 
general understanding of an ex post facto law was as good as anyone’s, and 
arguably more useful than Madison’s, Hamilton’s, or even Blackstone’s. 92  
Citation to The Federalist served a different purpose: it was an announcement of 
political affinity and an invocation of ethical authority. 
 Chief Justice Marshall, whose methodology originalists often link to their 
own,
93
 did not (pace Judge Easterbrook) shrink from historical references 
sounding in intentionalism.   In McCulloch v. Maryland,
94
 he invoked 
Washington’s authority, noting that arguments in favor of the constitutionality of 
the Bank of the United States “convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this 
country can boast.”95  Later in the same opinion Marshall referred directly to The 
Federalist,
96
 which had been cited by Maryland’s attorneys to support the 
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proposition that the Constitution contains no implicit limitations on state taxing 
power.
97
  In rebutting the argument, Marshall noted that “the opinions expressed 
by the authors of [The Federalist] have been justly supposed to be entitled to great 
respect in expounding the constitution.”98  This bit of rhetorical flourish might be 
discounted as softening Marshall’s subsequent rejection of The Federalist’s 
authority in the case, but it is more difficult to explain away Marshall’s coda to 
the discussion: 
 
Had the authors of those excellent essays been asked, whether they 
contended for that construction of the constitution, which would 
place within the reach of the States those measures which the 
government might adopt for the execution of its powers; no man, 
who has read their instructive pages, will hesitate to admit, that 
their answer must have been in the negative.
99
 
 
As security against his failure to persuade the reader that The Federalist supports 
his understanding of the constitutional structure, Marshall advances what would 
today be called an original expected applications argument.  There is no way to 
understand the argument as intentionalism in a purely linguistic sense; it is 
subjective intentionalism, plain and simple. 
Two years later, in Cohens v. Virginia,
100
 Marshall again cogently 
explained the value of The Federalist to constitutional interpretation and 
construction: 
 
The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of 
great authority.  It is a complete commentary on our constitution; 
and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that 
instrument has given birth.  Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high 
rank, and the part two of its authors performed in framing the 
constitution, put it very much in their power to explain the views 
with which it was framed.
101
 
 
Marshall said expressly, then, that we appeal to The Federalist both because of its 
“intrinsic merit” and because “the part two of its authors performed in framing the 
constitution” gives Madison and Hamilton authority to speak for the intentions of 
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the instrument.  As Eskridge writes, “[b]ackground history has an authority value 
when the materials are cited as independent authority for the legitimacy of a 
particular proposition.  The fact that a key player said thus and so is independent 
evidence supporting the proposition that the document meant thus and so.”102 
 Let us return, then, to poor Brutus, whose views are so often used as 
evidence of what the Constitution does not mean.
103
 Someone invoking authority 
value cares deeply about the identity and status of the referenced author.
104
  We 
assign greater value to the expectations of those who supported texts that reflect 
our constitutive commitments than to those who opposed those texts. Thus, 
Madison may have criticized reliance on the “authoritative character” of the 
Convention debates respecting “the legitimate meaning of the Instrument” but 
acknowledged  “the laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and 
progress of their political Institutions.”105  Madison, roughly, is distinguishing 
interpretation and construction in their modern sense. The intentions of the 
delegates in Philadelphia and of other approved authors are part of our national 
heritage, and that is reason enough for their subjective views to carry normative 
weight.
106
  As David McGowan writes, “by citing The Federalist, the Court 
attempts to establish its own ethos as an institution carrying on in the great 
tradition of the Founding Fathers.” 107  This is why we capitalize the words 
“Framers” and “Founders” and indeed “First Congress,” whose substantial 
overlap with the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention would not be 
noteworthy if their chief contribution to authority was their status as reasonable 
eighteenth-century Americans.
108
 
The ethical justification for original intent may also explain, in part, the 
fact that Federalist essays authored by Madison, father of the Constitution and a 
former President, are disproportionately important to constitutional practice.
109
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Much citation to the Records and to The Federalist appears to emerge from a 
phenomenon not unrelated to the use of famous athletes and entertainers in 
product advertisements.  Hutson somewhat dismissively recounts an article 
describing an attorney who refers to “selected snippets” from Farrand’s Records 
“not because he subscribes to their contents, but because he knows they will 
impress the judge and better justify his fee.”110   Hutson explains that “the judge, 
described in the same article, cites Farrand, not because he grounds his decision 
on the intentions of the Framers, but because references to them will make his 
opinion sound more learned and convincing.”111  Making one’s argument sound 
learned and convincing is an essential constitutive element of legal practice. The 
authors of a recent comprehensive study of citation to The Federalist concluded 
that the papers are referenced more often when the Court faces “special 
legitimacy challenges,” such as overruling precedent, invalidating a law, or when 
the vote is close.
112
 Judges in constitutional cases are not simply deciding the 
meaning of a text.  They are associating an outcome in a close, unsettled case with 
the commitments of the American people, sometimes embodied in text, but as 
often embodied in judicial and political precedent and in the narratives we tell 
ourselves about American identity.
113
  The wisdom reflected in the expectations 
of heroic historical figures can validate the conclusions modern judges reach in 
hard cases.
114
  As the study authors write, invoking the views of the Framers may 
“provide a veneer of authority that can insulate the Court, and the justice, from 
criticism and controversy.”115 
 
III. The Value of Original Intent 
 As Part II makes clear, original intent as such, invoked for its inherent 
authority value, has been a significant part of constitutional practice since the 
beginning of the republic and remains significant today.  This Article is not the 
first theoretical defense of this practice, but it claims important differences from 
extant accounts. Richard Kay has for many years been among the most prominent 
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academic defenders of the notion that subjective intentions are and should be 
relevant to constitutional interpretation,
116
 an idea that he says, correctly, “was, 
for a long time, so natural as to require no name.”117 Significantly, though, Kay’s 
defense of intentionalism is based on what is essentially a linguistic claim, that the 
“intention” behind the Constitution’s text—which original meaning proponents 
tend to agree is the proper object of interpretation
118—is better specified by the 
aggregated intentions of its actual rather than its hypothetical ratifiers.
119
 Kay 
agrees, then, with public meaning originalists that the intention of the 
Constitution’s ratifiers, not the drafters, is what matters.120  He is not, moreover, 
an expectations originalist.  He believes that there can be some distance between 
the rules the ratifiers intended to announce and how they expected those rules to 
be applied; the latter might be significant evidence of the former but carry no 
weight standing alone.
121
  Other nominal intentionalists, such as Larry Alexander, 
Saikrishna Prakash, and Keith Whittington, generally share each of these 
commitments.
122
 
 This article is not quite in this tradition, though Kay’s normative defense 
of his intentionalism also applies to the “authority”-based version I have 
articulated.  Kay worries that separating originalism from the actual views of 
historical actors diminishes its capacity to specify rules likely to be applied 
consistently over time.
123
  It also deprives the constitutional system of the 
legitimacy that may be conferred by the high regard we have for the moral and 
democratic authority of the lawmaker.
124
  Even if determining constitutional 
meaning is antecedent to determining the authority that meaning should have in 
modern adjudication, Kay writes, responding to his original meaning critics, “it 
does not follow that the historical process of lawmaking is irrelevant to the 
question of authority.”125  Both of these justifications for intentionalism not only 
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count in favor of the version this article identifies but are the very reasons why, 
within our system, original expectations are relevant as such.  We care about 
Madison’s, Hamilton’s, Jefferson’s, and Washington’s views both as to the 
intended rules and as to the expected application of those rules because 
adjudication according to their intentions and expectations better comports with a 
particular set of normative claims about the judicial role.
126
  Attention to original 
intentions and expectations facilitates judges’ guardianship of long-term values, 
helps to constitute us as a people with temporally extended commitments, and 
lends the framers’ credibility to the results reached through an otherwise 
legitimacy-challenged system of judge-made constitutional law.  Intentionalism 
on this Article’s view has a Burkean appeal that original meaning originalism 
lacks:
127
  It is Burkean both in the sense that it resists changes to longstanding 
assumptions about our constitutive commitments and in the sense that it shows 
humility toward the existing matrix of constitutional argument.
128
 
 This version of originalism has other advantages over academic theories of 
original meaning.  It more persuasively explains both the professional and the 
popular practice of originalism, including the reliance on Convention debates, the 
reliance on the writings of Madison and Jefferson, and the reliance on The 
Federalist. It also explains why the legislative history of the Constitution is 
essential to Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas while the legislative history of 
statutes is irrelevant to them.
129
  It does so while offering at least as good of an 
answer to the standard criticisms of original intent as original meaning offers.  It 
need not concern itself with the problem of aggregating intent because it is self-
consciously and unapologetically selective about whose intent matters. It is 
unbothered by the original understanding of original intent because it does not 
view intent as a source of textual meaning.  This authority-based version of 
originalism also rescues the method from the charge that a theory of meaning in 
the absence of a theory of authority is irrelevant to modern constitutional debate.  
In fact, this version of originalism does not require any independent theory of 
textual meaning, for it understands that when we do constitutional interpretation 
for real, we are interpreting a tradition rather than a text; what we need to know is 
not the linguistic meaning of ancient words but rather who or what speaks for the 
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tradition.  The originalist is and long has been the person who says that the 
founding generation best represents our constitutional tradition. 
 The chief objection to this approach is that it conflates the normative and 
the descriptive.  The reason so many originalists have turned to original meaning 
is because they believe other approaches to interpretation are inferior according to 
criteria that those originalists deem important.
130
  If one really does believe that 
the Constitution’s authority derives from its embodiment of binding commitments 
in a text, and if one really does believe that the original public meaning of that 
text specifies its legal meaning, then it is no answer to say simply that 
constitutional practice is inconsistent with that view.A further, related objection 
might be directed at the notion that judicial constitutional construction—which on 
some conceptions might be likened to the articulation of constitutional decision 
rules
131—should be performed according to criteria appropriate to the judicial 
role.  Thus, identification and navigation of relevant precedents might count, but 
choosing among competing cultural and political narratives might not.  On this 
view, the fact that judges affiliate with political and cultural narratives all the time 
is not, in itself, reason to tolerate the practice. 
The best response to the first version of this objection is a variant on 
Balkin’s response to originalists who criticize his approach.132  If we accept the 
interpretation-construction distinction, then there is no necessary incompatibility 
between an original meaning view and the use of original intent within 
constitutional construction.
 133
  Someone who believes the constitutional text is 
specified by its original public meaning is not disabled from arguing that original 
intentions are relevant to the separate question of the weight to give the text in 
adjudicating cases.  This paper is not a challenge to original public meaning 
interpretation as such; it is, rather, a reminder that reference to original intentions 
need not serve as a source of embarrassment for the method or for its 
practitioners, and indeed that original intent may be infused with the same 
Burkean sensibility that leads so many originalists to be fainthearted when push 
comes to shove.  
The second objection reflects a basic discomfort with ethical argument as 
an element of judicial practice. This objection sits at a point of incommensurable 
disagreement between originalists and their critics, the point where originalism’s 
nearly existential aspiration for constraint confronts the unavoidable reality of 
constitutional politics.  In the nature of incommensurability, we may do well 
simply to agree to disagree.  But for my part, I maintain that if judges are to 
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participate in the project of constitutional interpretation, they must never forget 
that it is, alas, a constitution they are expounding.
 
  To ask judges to ignore ethical 
argument is to ask them to interpret something else entirely. 
 
Conclusion 
 Originalists have thrown originalism under the bus.  The price of 
respectability within the legal academy has been self-alienation from a consistent, 
two-centuries-old practice of intentionalism.  Reliance on the authority of the 
intentions and expectations of the framers is an entirely respectable and time-
honored form of ethical argument in constitutional law, and it is a practice that 
most originalists are already engaged in.  What is sacrificed in conceding this 
rather obvious fact stems from the reality that this version of originalism is self-
consciously a form of story-telling. It therefore makes no special claim to reliance 
on quasi-technical or quasi-scientific methods.  It offers arguments rather than 
answers.  In doing so it admits that originalism, like all constitutional 
methodologies, is most interestingly a normative rather than a descriptive 
exercise, one whose only actual constraint is its practitioners’ power to persuade. 
 
